Abstract. We describe a syntactic method for taking proofs which use ultraproducts and translating them into direct, constructive proofs.
Introduction
Ultraproducts have been a powerful tool in various areas [5] of mathematics 1 . When used in areas other than logic, an ultraproduct is usually used in the following way.
• We begin with a sequence of structures M 1 , M 2 , . . ., M i , . . ., sometimes with the M i each finite in some sense (like cardinality, characteristic, or dimension) but with the finite value growing as i does.
• We construct an ultraproduct M U and work with this object as in any other proof-successively proving M U satisfies some lemma, then another lemma, and so on.
• We finish by showing that M U has some property which we can use to conclude something about the original structures M i . (In some cases a contradiction, thereby showing that the original sequence could not have existed.)
In such a proof, the essential properties of the ultraproduct must be determined by the original structures M i . While many specific questions about the ultraproduct might not be completely determined by the original structures (indeed, the point of the construction is that it uses an ultrafilter to resolve many questions about the ultraproduct in a coherent but arbitrary way), these questions must be inessential, because in actual applications the steps of the proof can be carried out without regard to how these additional questions are answered.
The intermediate steps of a proof using ultraproducts involve showing that the ultraproduct satisfies various properties. In this paper we are concerned with what these properties imply about the original structures.
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Suppose M U has a property P . What can we conclude about the original structures M i ? When P is a property which can be expressed in first-order logic, the answer is given by the well-known Łoś Theorem-P holds in M U if and only {i | M i has property P } belongs to the ultrafilter U.
It follows that no substantive proof using ultraproducts will consider only properties which can be expressed in first-order logic: if it did, the ultraproduct would be entirely extraneous, since one could carry out the proof unchanged in most of the original structures.
So we are mostly interested in the case P is not a first-order property. In actual examples, like those cited above, the additional ingredient is quantification over the natural numbers. (See Section 3 for concrete examples of what this looks like.) It turns out to be natural to consider a slightly more general setting: properties expressed in the logic L ω 1 ,ω , which allows arbitrary countably infinite conjunctions and disjunctions.
Because the sentences of L ω 1 ,ω can involve quantification over the natural numbers, they are often not meaningful in the original structures M i -for instance, the property "this structure is infinite" is easily expressed in L ω 1 ,ω , but it would be uninteresting to interpret that sentence in the structure M i if that structure happens to be finite.
Our main project will be giving an alternate semantics for sentences of L ω 1 ,ω which gives a meaningful interpretation in the original structures. This will be a bounded semantics, in which we replace infinite conjunctions and disjunctions with appropriate finite restrictions; it will then be sensible to ask when a sentence holds in an original structure in this bounded way.
The work of defining this semantics will occupy Section 4, where we will ultimately define a notion M ≤A,E σ, which will mean that the L ω 1 ,ω sentence σ holds in the structure M subject to the bounds A and E. Most of the difficulty will be establishing the right notion of what a bound is, which will become more complicated as σ does. We will then be able to establish our main result: 
The construction of our bounded semantics is based heavily on Kohlenbach's monotone functional interpretation [26] . Similar interpretations have been given in the context of nonstandard analysis by Nelson [31] and by van den Berg, Briseid, and Safarik [6] . (See also [12] , which gives an interpretation based on the bounded, rather than monotone, functional interpretation.) Most recent work applying these techniques has focused on questions about the logical strength of various principles in nonstandard settings, as in [4, 9, 35] .
Here our focus is on proofs from outside of logic: we can take a proof which uses an ultraproduct and translate the lemmas proved about that ultraproduct, one by one, into statements which are directly about the original structures. This gives some insight into why ultraproducts are useful in these proofs: the intermediate stages typically involve sentences σ whose bounded form is rather complicated. In this context it becomes clear that the power of the ultraproduct is to translate these complicated bounded statements into more conventional ones. However-as Examples 3.6 and 5.3 will illustrate-the bounded form that emerges from the translation is sometimes interesting in its own right. Furthermore, the bounded form typically has additional constructive 2 or explicit information that the ultraproduct form obscured. We discuss examples of applications of this translation in Section 5.
Notation
When {M i } i∈N is a sequence of structures and U is a non-principal ultrafilter, we write M U for the ultraproduct of this sequence. See, for instance, [25] for the details of the construction. The crucial property is:
Theorem 2.1 (Łoś Theorem). If σ is a sentence of first-order logic then
Slightly more generally, if for each i we have an element a i ∈ |M i |, we will write a i U ∈ M U for the corresponding element of M U . Then the Łoś Theorem also says:
Theorem 2.2. If φ is a first-order formula with free variables
2 Our results in this paper might appear to contradict Sanders' claims in [34] . In that paper, Sanders discusses the "metastability trade-off", in which "introducing a finite but arbitrarily large domain results in highly uniform and computable results". (See Example 3.6 for a longer discussion about the term metastability and how it relates to the construction in this paper.) Sanders claims to "place[] a hard limit on the generality of the metastability trade-off and show[] that metastability does not provide a 'king's road' towards computable mathematics." Yet that is precisely what we will do in this paper: by replacing quantification over infinite domains with the right arbitrarily large finite domains, we will obtain uniform and computable results, and we will do so in a quite general way. The issue is an ambiguity about the correct way to generalize metastability to more complicated sentences: Sanders only considers one particular generalization, and so the limitations he finds only apply to that. Here, as in the paper Sanders is responding to [28] and elsewhere in the literature [43] , we consider a different generalization based on the monotone functional interpretation. Sanders' result shows that at least some of the complexity of this translation is necessary.
In this paper we will only consider sequences indexed by N. The notions would carry over essentially unchanged to other countable index sets; similar ideas would apply with somewhat more care to ω-incomplete ultrafilters on uncountable index sets.
We define formulas of L ω 1 ,ω to be given by:
• every atomic formula (i.e. every formula Rt 1 · · · t n where R is an n-ary predicate symbol and each We do not include the existential quantifiers ∃xφ or i∈I φ i in the formal definition; instead we will treat these as abbreviations for ¬∀x¬φ and ¬ i∈I ¬φ i respectively. Similarly, we treat φ → ψ as an abbreviation for ¬(φ ∧ ¬ψ). Definition 2.3. We define the Π N n and Σ N n formulas by induction on n: • any first-order formula is both Π N 0 and Σ N 0 ,
. This definition can be extended to sentences of infinite ordinal complexity, but we will not need to consider these in this paper.
Motivating Examples
We begin by considering examples from several areas. These examples are not new-they are already well-understood without the more complicated methods we introduce later-but serve to motivate the techniques introduced below. Example 3.1 (Flatness of polynomial extensions). For each i, let k i be a field, and let k U be an ultraproduct of these fields; to avoid non-triviality, assume k U is infinite (so either the k i are infinite, or at least their sizes are unbounded).
There are two natural ways to think about rings of polynomials over k U : the usual ring of polynomials k U [x], or the ultraproduct of the rings of
. The latter ring is larger, since in addition to the usual polynomials, it has additional elements like "polynomials" of nonstandard degree. The ring
, but is not itself an ultraproduct of any sequence of rings.
A standard fact, often used when considering such rings (for instance, see [36] for many examples), is
. A definition of flatness will be given shortly. (We use a single variable only to simplify the notation; the same discussion would apply, essentially unchanged, with multiple variables.) This is a fact about ultraproducts of the sort we wish to consider. If we are being completely formal, our language is the language of rings with an additional predicate C for denoting the constants and our original structures are the rings k i [x] with the predicate C holding exactly of
is then the ultraproduct of these structures and
is the subset defined by the predicate C.
However flatness is not expressed by a first-order formula. The substruc-
cannot be defined using a first-order formula because it requires considering polynomials of arbitrary but finite degree-that is, it requires quantification over the natural numbers. Therefore we need to use a sentence of L ω 1 ,ω to write down a sentence which captures flatness.
There is a formulation of flatness in terms of solutions to linear equations; the fact above is equivalent to the Π N 2 sentence For every homogeneous linear equation in finitely many variables with coefficients from
. Flatness can be expressed by a formula in the form n∈N d∈D
where θ m,b (t 1 , . . . , t n ) is a first-order formula which says any solution i≤n t i g i = 0 to the homogeneous linear equation i≤n t i y i = 0 can be written as a sum of at most m solutions of degree at most b. (Here we are writing ∀{c i,j } i≤n,j≤d ⊆ k U as an abbreviation for a long series of quantifiers ∀c 1,
A standard property of ultraproducts-countable saturation-lets us swap the first-order and countable quantifiers in this case, so the flatness of
The Łoś Theorem does not apply to this statement, but it does apply to the inner part, so, using this fact, we can derive a purely standard consequence. 
We let k m = k m,m and consider any ultraproduct k U . By assumption, there must be some m, b such that
and by the Łoś Theorem, for almost every m ′ we have
In particular, we can find such an m ′ with m ′ ≥ max{m, b}, which contradicts our assumption: since
is a linear combination of at most m solutions of degree at most b.
This sort of equivalence is what we expect of properties expressed by Π N 2 formulas-we will have M U n m φ n,m exactly when, for each n there is an m such that for almost every i, M i φ n,m . (This is basically the content of the transfer theorem often used in nonstandard analysis.) That is, truth of the statement in the ultraproduct is equivalent to a certain kind of uniform truth in the original structures: we can find a bound n which depends on m, but not on the particular structure. Furstenberg and Weiss gave a topological proof [14] using the following theorem as a key step: Theorem 3.5. Let X be a non-empty compact topological space and let T : X → X be a homeomorphism. Then for any open cover X = U 0 ∪· · ·∪U r of X and any k ≥ 1, there exists i ≤ r, an x ∈ X, and an integer s so that
Formally, we work in a language with a unary function symbol T and r +1 predicate symbols, which we may as well denote U 0 , . . ., U r . Suppose van der Waerden's Theorem were false-for some k, r there exists an n and a partition [0, n] = U 0 ∪· · ·∪U r so that no U i contains an arithmetic progression of length k.
We view each of these examples as a finite structure ([0, n], S, U 0 , . . . , U r ) where S is the function mapping a to a + 1 mod n. An ultraproduct of such structures gives rise to a topological space X with a partition X = U 0 ∪ · · · ∪ U r in which the theorem above implies For every k ∈ N there is some i ≤ r, some x ∈ X, and some s ∈ N so that x, T s x, T 2s x, . . ., T (k−1)s x ∈ U i . Since k and s are natural numbers, this is not a statement of first-order logic, but this is a statement in L ω 1 ,ω :
In particular, there must be some i ≤ r, some x ∈ X, and some s ∈ N so that T js ∈ U i for all j ∈ [0, 2k
In this example, the property we were concerned with was again expressed by a Π N 2 formula. Example 3.6 (Convergence). Examples involving convergence of sequences occur both in applications involving ergodic theory (as in [39] ) and functional analysis (as in [42] ). To avoid issues of measurability, consider a pure metric space, so the language includes a distance function. More precisely, to stay in the realm of first-order languages, suppose we have a language containing countably many binary predicates d <1/n and countably many constant symbols c k .
Suppose we have a collection of metric spaces (X i , d i ) of diameter 1 and, in each of these spaces, a sequence {a i k }. We can interpret these metric spaces as structures in our language:
k . The ultraproduct M U gives rise to a pseudo-metric space where we define
We could obtain a proper metric space by taking a quotient by the equivalence relation
The statement that the sequence a k converges is not first-order, but can once again be expressed in L ω 1 ,ω :
This is Π N 3 , not Π N 2 , and the behavior is more subtle. Unlike the previous examples, convergence of a k does not imply that most of the sequences Instead, convergence of a k is equivalent to a more complicated propertythe "uniform metastable convergence"-of the a i k ( [2, 27, 29, 39] ). The relationship between metastable convergence and ultraproducts was studied explicitly in [3, 10] . 
Suppose the second statement is false, so there is an ǫ > 0 and an
Pick n with 1/n < ǫ. Then, for every m, {i 
A Bounded Semantics
4.1. Bounds. Our main goal is to define a "bounded semantics"
where ψ n,m is first-order. In the usual, unbounded, semantics, M n m ψ n,m [ b] holds when, for each n, there is an m so that M ψ n,m [ b] . In the bounded semantics, we wish to assign bounds to n and m-essentially, in this case A and B will be natural numbers, and
The situation will become more complicated when the formulas become more complicated. For instance, consider a Π N 3 formula
It will not work for our purposes to bound m with a single natural number depending on n. Instead, the kind of bound we need will take A to be a pair (N, F ) where N ∈ N and F : N → N is a monotone function (i.e. F (m) ≤ F (m + 1) for all n). Then E will again be a natural number, and we will say
(This is the sort of bound which appeared in Example 3.6.) Note that the equivalent bounded property continues to have a "for every A there is an E" form, even though the formula n m k φ n,m,k has a more complicated structure. Our bounds for even more complicated formulas will also continue this. So for each formula φ, we will need to define two sets, S ∀ φ and S ∃ φ , denoting the set of bounds A could be chosen from and the set of bounds E could be chosen from, respectively. (The letter S denotes "strategy", since we can think of these bounds as being strategies in a certain game.)
As we generalize this to more complicated formulas, we need higher order functionals-that is, functions whose domains or ranges are themselves functions. In order to ensure that our bounds are preserved by ultraproducts, we need to restrict ourselves to functionals whose values are determined by finite amounts of data.
The full definitions require some technical work, so we briefly outline the idea here in the simplest case where most of the complications show up: when φ is ¬ n m φ n,m and each φ n,m is a first-order formula. In this case S ∃ φ will be the set of monotone functions from N to N. The elements of S ∀ φ will be certain kinds of functions from S ∃ φ to N; specifically, when F ∈ S ∀ φ , F should be continuous, in the sense that whenever A ∈ S ∃ φ , there should be some finite partial functions a ⊆ A so that for all A ′ with a ⊆ A ′ ,
It is establishing the right notion of continuity, especially as our definitions continue recursively to more complicated formulas, that will take some care. We will define families of partial functions P ∀ φ and P ∃ φ ; for example, in this case P ∃ φ will be partial functions a from N to N whose domain has the form [0, n] for some n and a(i) ≤ a(i + 1) for all i < n. Similarly, P ∀ φ will consist of finite partial functions from P ∃ φ to N satisfying certain monotonicity requirements.
The elements of P ∀ φ can have a defect that prevents them from extending to elements of S ∀ φ . Let a, a ′ ∈ P ∃ φ be the partial functions a = {(0, 1)} and a ′ = {(1, 1)}. We could have f ∈ P ∀ φ so that f (a) = 4 but f (a ′ ) = 5. This is a problem, because a and a ′ have a union: let a ′′ = {(0, 1), (1, 1)}; what should f (a ′′ ) be? Our solution is to declare that f is "incoherent". We will define F ∀ φ ⊆ P ∀ φ to consist only of the coherent partial functions-partial functions which map compatible inputs to compatible outputs.
The sets F Q φ will be the actual finite fragments of data we will work with. Our formal definition of S Q φ will be as a topological space-for each f ∈ F Q φ , we will define U f to be the set of all F ∈ S Q φ extending f . These sets U f will give the topology we need in our recursive step, so that S ∀ ¬φ will be precisely the continuous functions satisfying a certain monotonicity requirement.
Finite Fragments.
We first define the sets P ∀ φ and P ∃ φ for each formula φ. These sets represent our basic building blocks: for Q ∈ {∀, ∃}, the elements of P Q φ are "finite fragments" of data about a bound on φ. Since most of our bounds will ultimately be functions of various kinds, the elements of P Q φ are mostly partial functions. We will have two relations on these sets. We will say f ⊆ g if g is a larger finite fragment than f (that is, if g agrees with f and also might provide additional information); for instance, when f and g are partial functions, f ⊆ g will hold when g is literally an extension of f . We will say f ≤ g if g provides larger bounds; when f and g are natural numbers, this will be the usual ordering, and when f and g are partial functions this will generally mean that f (i) ≤ g(i) for all i in some set. Definition 4.1. We define P ∀ φ and P ∃ φ by induction on φ: • When φ is atomic, P ∀ φ = P ∃ φ is the set with a single point denoted * .
• When φ is ¬ψ, we define:
• When φ is ∀xψ we define:
-P ∀ φ = P ∀ ψ and P ∃ φ = P ∃ ψ , -the orderings ≤ and ⊆ are the same as for ψ.
• When φ is i∈I ψ i (where I = {0, 1} or I = N), we define:
-elements of P ∃ φ are finite subsets f of i∈I P ∃
φ then f ⊆ g exactly when, for each e ∈ f , there is an e ′ ∈ g with e ⊆ e ′ , -if f, g ∈ P ∃ φ then f ≤ g exactly when, for each e ∈ f , there is an e ′ ∈ g with e ≤ e ′ , and for each e ′ ∈ g there is an e ∈ f with e ≤ e ′ , -P ∀ φ consists of functions f whose domain is a finite subset of
The crucial point of this definition is the following lemma.
Lemma 4.2. For any
Almost all proofs and constructions involving the sets P Q φ will be by induction on φ; the case where φ is atomic is typically trivial and the case where φ is ∀xψ or ∃xψ will typically follow immediately from the inductive hypothesis, as will the case where φ is ¬ψ and Q is ∃. The case where φ is i∈I ψ i will typically either be a simplification of the ¬ψ case or follow directly from the inductive hypothesis. Therefore in the proofs below, when we note that the proof is by induction we will turn immediately to the main case, where φ is ¬ψ and Q is ∀.
Lemma 4.3. For any φ and any
Suppose φ is ¬ψ. Let f and g be be elements of P ∀ φ with f ≤ g and g ≤ f . Then dom(f ) = dom(g) and, for every a in this common domain, f (a) ≤ g(a) and g(a) ≤ f (a) so, by the inductive hypothesis, f (a) = g(a). Therefore f = g. Definition 4.4. For any φ, if f, g 0 , g 1 ∈ P Q φ and both g 0 ≤ f and g 1 ≤ f , we define an element min{g 0 , g 1 } ∈ P Q φ recursively by:
• When φ is ∀xψ the definition is the same as for ψ.
• When φ is i∈I ψ i : -if Q is ∃ then min{g 0 , g 1 } = {min{e 0 , e 1 } | there is some e ∈ f such that e 0 ≤ e and e 1 ≤ e},
Lemma 4.5. For any φ and any f, g 0 , g 1 ∈ P Q φ such that g 0 ≤ f and g 1 ≤ f , the function min satisfies the following properties:
Suppose φ is ¬ψ.
(1): Let f, g 0 , g 1 ∈ P ∀ φ be given with g 0 ≤ f and g 1 ≤ f . The inductive hypothesis guarantees that min{g 0 , g 1 } is a partial function from P ∀ ψ to P ∃ ψ with a finite domain. To check that min{g 0 , g 1 } ∈ P ∀ φ , we must check the monotonicity conditions.
Let
(2) and (3) are immediate from the definition.
• When φ is ¬ψ: -if Q is ∃ then the definition is the same as for
• When φ is i∈I ψ i :
e * ∈ f * and there is an e ∈ f such that e ′ ≤ e and e * ⊆ e},
Lemma 4.7. For any φ and any f, f ′ , f * ∈ P Q φ such that f ′ ≤ f and f * ⊆ f , the function ↾ satisfies the following properties:
Proof. By induction on φ.
The inductive hypothesis guarantees that f ′ ↾ f * is a partial function from P ∀ ψ to P ∃ ψ with a finite domain. To check that f ′ ↾ f * ∈ P ∀ φ , we must check the monotonicity conditions.
The second monotonicity requirement requires more manipulation. Let
(4): Suppose g is some function with g ⊆ f ′ and g ≤ f * . Then dom(g) = dom(g * ) = dom(f ′ ↾ f * ) and for each a ∈ dom(g) we have g(a) ⊆ f ′ (a) and g(a) ≤ f * (a), so by the inductive hypothesis, g(a) = (f ′ ↾ f * )(a).
(5): Suppose we also have g, g ′ , g * with g ′ ≤ g, g * ⊆ g, and all of g ⊆ f ,
and, for each a in this domain, (g ′ ↾ g * )(a) ⊆ (f ′ ↾ f * )(a) by the inductive hypothesis.
(6): Suppose we also have g, g ′ , g * with g ′ ≤ g, g * ⊆ g, and all of g ≤ f , • When φ is atomic, F is always coherent.
is also coherent.
, and for each i in the common domain, {f (i)} f ∈F is coherent.
For any φ and any finite, coherent, non-empty subset F ⊆ P Q φ , we define an element F by:
• When φ is atomic, F = * .
is the domain of any (and therefore every) element of F and ( F)(i) = {f (i)} f ∈F .
Lemma 4.9. For any φ and any finite coherent
F ⊆ P Q φ , (1) F ∈ P Q φ , (2) if f ∈ F then f ⊆ F, (3) if f ∈ P Q φ and {f } is coherent then {f } = f , (4) if G ⊆ P Q φ and there is a function σ : G → F such that g ⊆ σ(g) for all g ∈ G then G is coherent and G ⊆ F, (5) if G ⊆ P Q φ is coherent and there is a relation π ⊆ F × G such that • for each f ∈ F there is a g ∈ G with (f, g) ∈ π, • for each g ∈ G there is an f ∈ F with (f, g) ∈ π, • if (f, g) ∈ π then g ≤ f , then G ≤ F.
Proof. By induction on φ.
Suppose φ is ¬ψ. Let a finite coherent set F ⊆ P ∀ φ be given. (1): First, note that for any a ∈ f ∈F dom(f ), since {a} is coherent, also {b} b⊆a,b∈ f ∈F dom(f ) is coherent and {b} b⊆a,b∈ f ∈F dom(f ) ⊆ a by the inductive hypothesis, so {f (b)} b⊆a,f ∈F ,b∈dom(f ) is coherent as well.
As usual, we need to check the monotonicty requirements. Let a, a ′ ∈ dom(F) with a ′ ⊆ a.
Then G ′ ⊆ G, so the identity maps G ′ to G and the inductive hypothesis en-
We define a function σ :
by the inductive hypothesis, so is H, and H ⊆ G ′ = ( F)(a ′ ). Then, by the inductive hypothesis again, H ≤ G = ( F)(a).
(2) and (3) are immediate from the definition. (3): Let G ⊆ P ∀ φ and σ : G → F be given. For any a ∈ g∈G dom(g), we have a ∈ dom(g) and so a ∈ dom(σ(g)), so {a} is coherent. For any coherent A ⊆ g∈G dom(g), we similarly have A ⊆ f ∈F dom(g), so F ′ = {f (a)} a∈A,f ∈F ,a∈dom(f ) is coherent. Consider G ′ = {g(a)} a∈A,g∈G,a∈dom(g) ; we may define σ : G ′ → F ′ by taking σ(g(a)) = (σ(g))(a) (choosing arbitrarily if there are multiple choices for g, b). Then, by the inductive hypothesis, G ′ is coherent and G ′ ⊆ F ′ . Therefore G ⊆ F. (4): Let G ⊆ P ∀ φ be coherent and let π ⊆ F × G be given. Since whenever (f, g) ∈ π we have dom(f ) = dom(g), we have dom( G) = dom( F). For any a in this domain, let F ′ = {f (b)} b⊆a,f ∈F ,b∈dom 9f ) and
For any d ∈ F ′ , we may find some f ∈ F and some b ⊆ a with f (b) = d, so some g ∈ G with (f, g) ∈ π, so b ∈ dom(g), so (d, g(b) ) ∈ π; a symmetric argument holds for d ′ ∈ G ′ . Therefore, by the inductive hypothesis, ( G)(a) = G ′ ≤ F ′ = ( F)(a). such that {f } is coherent.
When working with elements of F Q ¬ψ , it is convenient to replace coherent subsets of the domain with single elements: given f ∈ F Q ¬ψ , we may definẽ f ⊇ f by:
Lemma 4.14.
¬ψ and g ≤f then g =g.
for all b ∈ A, so we certainly have that {(f ′ ↾ f * )(b)} b∈A is coherent. Suppose f, g 0 , g 1 ∈ F ∀ ¬ψ . When f =f (and therefore g 0 =g 0 , g 1 =g 1 ) it is immediate from the inductive hypothesis that min{g 0 , g 1 } ∈ F ∀ ¬ψ . So given f f , observe that min{g 0 , g 1 } = min{g 0 ,g 1 } ↾ f , so the claim follows from the previous lemma.
Then there is an
Proof. By induction on φ.
When φ is ¬ψ and Q is ∀, let f, g, g ′ , K be given. We claim that, without loss of generality, we may assume that f =f (and therefore k =k for all k ∈ K). For suppose we findf ′ ≤f with each g ′ ⊆f ′ and eachk ≤f ′ ; then we may take f ′ =f ′ ↾ f .
So we assume that f =f . We will construct f ′ ⊇ g ′ by adding elements to the domain one by one, so it suffices to construct an f ′ with g ′ ⊆ f ′ and dom(f ′ ) = dom(g ′ ) ∪ {a} for some a ∈ dom(f ) \ dom(g ′ ) such that for any a ′ ∈ dom(f ) with either a ′ ⊆ a or a ′ ≤ a, a ′ ∈ dom(g ′ ).
Let B be the set of b such that b ⊆ a and b ∈ dom(g). If B is empty then we may simply set f ′ (a) = f (a); this satisfies the monotonicity requirement
So suppose B is non-empty. Let D = {g(b)} b∈B and
Let L 0 consist of all elements of the form g ′ (a ′ ) ↾ f (a) with a ′ < a and let L 1 consist of all k(a ′ ) ↾ f (a) with a ′ ≤ a and k ∈ K.
We claim that f (a), d, d ′ , L 0 ∪ L 1 satisfy the assumptions of the lemma so that we can apply the inductive hypothesis; the condition remaining to check is that, for any ℓ
So the inductive hypothesis gives us a b * ≤ f (a) with g ′ (b) ⊆ b * for all b ∈ B and k(a) ≤ b * for all k ∈ B, and we define f ′ ⊇ g ′ by f ′ (a) = b * .
Satisfaction.
Because we are dealing with partial functions, it is possible that attempting to evaluate these functions could lead us outside the domain. We wish to define the case where enough values are defined for the process of bounding a formula to complete.
Definition 4.18. When a ∈ F ∀
φ and e ∈ F ∃ φ , we define when the pair (a, e) is decisive for φ inductively:
• When φ is atomic, (a, e) is always decisive for φ.
• When φ is ¬ψ, (a, e) is decisive for φ if for every e ′ ≤ e there is an e * ⊆ e ′ such that (e ′ , a(e * )) is decisive. • When φ is ∀xψ, (a, e) is decisive for φ iff (a, e) is decisive for ψ.
• When φ is i∈I ψ i , (a, e) is decisive for φ iff for each i ∈ dom (a) there is an r ∈ e ∩ F ∃ 
Proof. By induction on φ.
When φ is ¬ψ, for everyê ≤ e ′ , we have a uniqueê ↾ e ≤ e, and therefore an e * ⊆ê ↾ e ⊆ê such that (ê ↾ e, a(e * )) is decisive for ψ. Since a(e * ) ⊆ a ′ (e * ), also (ê, a ′ (e * )) is decisive for ψ.
When φ is i∈I ψ i , we have we have dom(a ′ ) ⊆ dom(a), so for each i ∈ dom(a ′ ) there is an r ∈ e ∩ F ∃ ψ i such that (a(i), r) is decisive for ψ i ; there is an r ′ ∈ e ′ with r ⊆ r ′ , so by the inductive hypothesis, (a ′ (i), r ′ ) is decisive for ψ i as well.
Definition 4.21. Suppose a ∈ F ∀
φ and e ∈ F ∃ φ and (a, e) is decisive for φ. We define when M ≤a,e φ[ b] holds recursively.
• If φ is ¬ψ, M ≤a,e φ[ b] holds iff there is an e ′ ≤ e and an e * ⊆ e ′ such that (e ′ , a(e * )) is decisive for ψ and 
4.4.
Strategies. We want to extend these finite fragments to total "strategies" which are always decisive. These strategies will be topological spaces S Q φ with a family of basic open sets given by
Definition 4.24.
• When φ is atomic, S Q φ is a singleton set and the only basic open set is U * = { * } where * is the unique element of both S Q φ and F Q φ .
• When φ is ¬ψ:
-S ∃ φ = S ∀ ψ with the same topology.
φ , U f is the set of F such that for each e ∈ f there is an E ∈ F ∩ U e .
-S ∀ φ consists of functions F whose domain is a finite subset of I and F (i) ∈ S ∀ ψ i for all i ∈ dom(F ). For any f ∈ F ∀ φ , U f is the set of F such that dom(F ) = dom(f ) and for every i ∈ dom(f ),
Definition 4.25. We define partial orderings on S Q φ recursively by:
• When φ is atomic, the ordering is trivial.
-When Q is ∃, the definition is the same as for
• When φ is ∀xψ the definition is the same as for
Definition 4.26. When F ⊆ S
Q φ is non-empty and finite, we define a max F ∈ S Q φ by:
• When φ is atomic, max F = * .
• When φ is ∀xψ the definition is the same as for P Q ψ .
• When φ is i∈I ψ i : 
Lemma 4.27. For any non-empty finite
F ⊆ S ∀ φ , F ≤ max F for all F ∈ F.
Proof. By induction on φ.
Suppose φ is ¬ψ and let f ∈ F ∀ φ . Since f ⊆f , we have Uf ⊆ U f , so we may assume without loss of generality that f =f . Order dom(f ) so that if a ′ ⊆ a then a ≺ a ′ and if a ≤ a ′ then a ≺ a ′ ; by induction along ≺, for each a ∈ dom(f ) choose a B a ∈ U f (a) such that if a ′ ∈ dom(f ), a * ⊆ a ′ , and a * ≤ a then B a ′ ≤ B a . (Since maxima exist over finite sets by the previous lemma, such elements always exist.) We define F ∈ S ∀ φ by taking, for each A ∈ S ∀ ψ , the longest (i.e. ⊆-maximal) a ∈ dom(f ) with A ∈ U f , and setting F (A) = B a . Such a function is automatically continuous and satisfies the monotonicity requirement. 
Suppose φ is ¬ψ and Q is ∀.
is finite and coherent then there is an a = A and an A ∈ U a by the previous lemma; since F (A) is defined, for each f ∈ A and a ′ ∈ A, f (a ′ ) ⊆ F (A), so by the inductive hypothesis, {f (a)} a∈A,f ∈C(F ),a∈dom(f ) is coherent.
Next, suppose g ∈ F ∀ φ \ C(F ). Since g ⊆ F , so there is some a ∈ dom(g) and some A ∈ U a with F (A) ∈ U g(a) . Since g(a) ⊆ F (A), by the inductive hypothesis there is a finite B ⊆ C(F (A)) such that B ∪{g(a)} is not coherent. By the continuity of F , for each b ∈ B there is an
Then {f, g} is not coherent because {a} ∪ {a b } b∈B ⊆ C(A) is coherent but {g(a)} ∪ {b} b∈B is not.
Lemma 4.33. For any A ∈ S ∀
φ and E ∈ S ∃ φ , there exist a, e so that A ∈ U a , E ∈ U e , and (a, e) is decisive for φ.
Proof. By induction on φ.
Suppose φ is ¬ψ. By the inductive hypothesis, there are e 0 , a 0 so that E ∈ U e 0 and A(E) ∈ U a 0 so that (e 0 , a 0 ) is decisive for ψ. Since E ∈ A −1 (U a 0 ), we may choose some e ⊇ e 0 so that E ∈ U e ⊆ U e 0 and A(U e ) ⊆ U a 0 . Choose a so that A ∈ U a and a 0 ⊆ a(e). Then for any e ′ ≤ e, we have e ′ ↾ e 0 ≤ e 0 , so a(e ′ ↾ e 0 ) ≤ a(e 0 ), and therefore (e ′ ↾ e 0 , a(e ′ ↾ e 0 )) is decisive for ψ. So (a, e) is decisive for φ.
In light of these lemmas, we can define: 
Proof. By induction on φ. For atomic formulas, this is the definition.
, so by the inductive hypothesis there is some A so that for every E,
Conversely, suppose M φ [ b] , so by the inductive hypothesis, for every A there is an E such that M ≤A,E ψ [ b] . For each A, take some E such that M ≤A,E ψ [ b] , and choose some a ⊆ A, e ⊆ E so that M ≤a,e ψ [ b] . Let F 0 be the set of all pairs we obtain this way.
We define F 1 ⊆ F 0 as follows: for each a, if there is any a ′ a and E ′ with (a ′ , E ′ ) ∈ F 0 then (a, E) ∈ F 1 for any E, and if a is ⊆-minimal such that there is some E with (a, E) ∈ F 0 , we choose a single such E and put (a, E) in F 1 . Note that we have retained the property that, for each A, there is an a ⊆ A and an E with (a, E) ∈ F 1 .
We order E 1 ) , . . .}. We define F 2 inductively as follows: suppose we have already which (a ′ , E)} ∈ F 2 for j < i and a j ⊆ a ′ , and we consider the pair (a i , E). We place (a i ∪ b, E i ) in F 2 where b ranges over ⊆-minimal elements such that {a j , a i ∪ b} is not coherent. After this change, if (a, E), (a ′ , E ′ ) ∈ F 2 and E = E ′ then {a, a ′ } is not coherent.
We now modify F 2 repeatedly as follows:
and an a * a so that a * ≤ a ′ , we remove (a, E) and replace it with (a * , E ′ ),
we remove (a ′ , E ′ ) and replace it with (a ′ , max{E, E ′ }).
Note that a given pair (a, E) ∈ F 2 can only be modified finitely many times (once for each a * * ≤ a * ⊆ a), so for each a this process stabilizes, so we can speak of a limit F 3 of this process. Now we define F by setting F (A) = E where (a, E) ∈ F 3 for some (equivalently, any) a ⊇ A. F is continuous by construction, monotonic because of the way we passed from F 2 to F 3 , and for any A we have when φ a first-order formula, both S ∀ φ and S ∃ φ are one point sets-that is, the bound is trivial since there is only one possible "bound" on the statement. In particular, Theorem 4.36 for first-order formulas says nothing other than Łoś Theorem.
With a Π N 1 formula φ = i∈N φ i , where each φ i is first-order, S ∀ φ is isomorphic to N as an ordered set. (Formally, S ∀ φ is a function F with domain [0, n] and, for each i ≤ n, F (i) belongs to a one point set.) S ∃ φ is a one point set (it is a union of one point sets, and we should treat the elements of these sets as being identical).
When φ is Σ N 1 , i∈N φ i m (that is, ¬ i∈N ¬φ i ) where each φ i is first-order, S ∃ φ is essentially N while S ∀ φ is a one point set. When φ is a Π N 2 formula i∈N j∈N φ i,j where each φ i,j is a first-order set, we get a slightly more interesting case: both S ∀ φ and S ∃ φ are essentially N. In this case, Theorem 4.36 is essentially the transfer theorem.
When φ is a Σ N 2 formula i∈N j∈N φ i,j , S ∃ φ is N, but S ∀ φ now consists of monotone functions from N to N. When φ is i∈N j∈N k∈N φ i,j,k , S ∃ φ is still N, but S ∀ φ is now a function with domain [0, n] and range monotone functions from N to N. When F ∈ S ∀ φ , we lose nothing by replacing F with the function F ′ with dom(F ′ ) = dom(F ) and F ′ (i)(k) = max i≤n F (i)(k), so we may assume F is constant-that is, we may view F as an element of N together with a single monotone function from N to N. This is precisely the sort of bound we described in Example 3.6.
Approximate
Subgroups. An example of this sort of interpretation being applied to a Π N 3 formula appears in [24] . 
such that X and X 1 are e-commensurable and, for 1 ≤ m, n < N , we have
The function parameter in this theorem is slightly unusual, but its appearance is unsurprising when we realize that the theorem is proven by showing the following in an ultraproduct: Theorem 5.3. Let G U be an ultraproduct of groups. For any k there are e, c so that, for any internal set X ⊆ G U with |XX −1 X| ≤ k|X| and any N , there is a sequence
of internal subsets of G such that X and X 1 are e-commensurable and, for 1 ≤ m, n < N , we have
We may view this as an L ω 1 ,ω sentence over a two-sorted language, with one sort for the group and one sort for the subsets. In the ultraproduct, this second sort is inhabited by the internal subsets of G. We may write this theorem as a Π N 3 sentence, and the finite form above is then exactly what Corollary 4.39 would predict.
5.3. Szemerédi Regularity. Another example comes from Tao's strong regularity lemma [40] .
We work in a large finite graph (X, E).
Definition 5.4. When U, V ⊆ X, we define the edge density between U and V by
We say U, V are ǫ-regular if whenever U ′ ⊆ U , V ′ ⊆ V , and
Roughly speaking, U, V are ǫ-regular if the edges of E are distributed roughly uniformly between them-any reasonably large subsets have about the "right" number of edges.
One version of Szemerédi's regularity lemma [38] says Theorem 5.5. For each ǫ > 0 there is a K so that, for any finite graph
Roughly speaking, this says that most points (x, y) belong to a rectangle U i × U j which is ǫ-regular. There are many variants (for instance, many versions also require that the U i all have almost exactly the same size, perhaps at the cost of one additional partition piece U 0 ), but these versions can all be derived from each other with a small amount of additional effort.
Many variants of the regularity lemma (such as the "strong" regularity lemma [1] ) can be derived from a more general theorem showing that there are always partitions with "nearly maximal energy".
The energy of a partition
It is not hard to see that 0 ≤ E({U i } i,j≤k ) ≤ 1 and a Cauchy-Schwarz argument shows that when 
The usual Szemerédi's Theorem follows by taking F (n) = n2 n and showing that whenever (U i , U j ) fails to be regular, we can split U i and U j into two sets U i = U The presence of the function F suggests that there should be a corresponding fact in an ultraproduct. We work in a language with a binary relation E whch will represent the edges of a graph.
Consider a sequence of finite graphs G n = (X n , E n ) with |X n | → ∞. Let M be the ultraproduct; we have an edge relation E on X = |M| and on each set X n we have the Loeb measure µ n (see [16] for details).
In the ultraproduct, the set E is a measurable subset of X 2 . We have two σ-algebras on X 2 -the σ-algebra B 2 given directly by the Loeb measure, and the σ-algebra B 2 1 given by taking the power of the σ-algebra B 1 on X. The σ-algebra B 2 1 is generated by rectangles B × C where B, C ∈ B 1 . Standard facts about Loeb measure ensure that B 2 1 ⊆ B 2 , so we can consider the projection of E onto B 2 1 : E(χ E | B 2 1 ) is the function which is measurable with respect to B 2 1 which minimizes the distance
The actual existence of the function E(χ E | B 2 1 ) is an abstract measuretheoretic fact that we cannot express even in L ω 1 ,ω . But we can express the next best thing: that E(χ E | B 2 1 ) can be approximated by the projections of χ E onto finite sub-algebras. That is, for each ǫ > 0 there is a finite algebra B ⊆ B 2 1 so that for any other finite algebra
By standard manipulations in probability theory, we can restrict ourselves to the case where B has the form {U 1 , . . . , U k } × {U 1 , . . . , U k }, and where we only consider B ′ refining B (by replacing B ′ with the common refinement of B and B ′ ). Finally, observing that
, we see that we are considering the statement:
For each ǫ > 0 there is a partition
Technically we need to add some predicates to our language making it possible to write down formulas about the measure; see [19] for one way to do this. We also need to add a sort for internal subsets of X. After these tweaks to the language, this is a Π N 3 sentence. Stated like this, we see that Tao 
After some work combining conjunctions to get this statement in a prenex form, we get a Π N 5 sentence. Theorem 4.39 gives a corresponding theorem about finite partitions in finite graphs, though it will clearly be quite complicated. When d > 3, the statement becomes even more complicated: the analogous statement for d-ary hypergraphs will be Π N 2d−1 . A special case (analogous to the way Szemerédi regularity follows from a special case of Tao's regularity lemma) is known as hypergraph regularity [20, 33] ; the statement is quite complicated, which is not surprising given that it corresponds to a fairly complicated L ω 1 ,ω formula.
5.5.
Hilbertianity. An example of how these results apply to non-prenex formulas is given by the Gilmore-Robinson characterization of Hilbertian fields. A field is Hilbertian if every set H K (f 1 , . . . , f m ; g) is nonempty.
Hilbertianity is incompatible with algebraic closure except in trivial cases: roughly speaking, in a Hilbertian field, polynomials which always factor must factor uniformly. That is, if, for every a ∈ K, the polynomial f When K is countable, this becomes a formula of L ω 1 ,ω . We take the language to be the language of K-rings-that is, the language of rings together with a constant symbol for each element of k. Then the statement that t ∈ K U \ K becomes ∃t k∈K (t = k).
There are only countably many elements of K(t), so we can quantify over them using a quantifier: the statement K(t) ∩ K U = K(t) becomes p∈K(y) [x] ∀x p(t, x) = 0 → u∈K(y)
x = u(t).
Putting these together, we get the formula This behaves roughly like a Σ N 3 sentence. Let S consist of finite subsets of K. By Corollary 4.37 (with the sequence M i = K for all i) together with a little work interpreting the result, we get:
For every function Q : ((S × N) → N) → (S × N) which is continuous (where S × N and N have the discrete topology and the topology on (S × N) → N is generated by sub-basic sets of the form {F | F (S, n) = m}), there is an F : (S×N) → N such that, taking Q(F ) = (S, n), there is a t ∈ K \ S so that for any p ∈ K[t −1 , t, x] of degree at most n, if there is an x ∈ K with p(x) = 0 then there is a u ∈ K[t −1 , t] of degree at most F (S, n) with p(u) = 0. 5.6. Other Examples. The technique of this paper has been used in several places to obtain constructive or explicit information from proofs which use ultraproducts. As the other examples show, the case of Π N 3 sentences has been investigated independently several times. Therefore these techniques are mostly useful in proofs whose intermediate steps involve sentences of higher complexity.
In [43] , the author applied this technique to a statement involving showing that two double limits are equal-that for a particular sequence a m,k . At its fullest complexity, this is For every ǫ > 0 there are m and k so that for all m ′ > m, k ′ > k there are l and n so that for all l ′ > l and n ′ > n, |a m ′ ,l ′ − a n ′ ,k ′ | < ǫ which is Π N 5 . In fact, [43] analyzes the slightly less complicated Π N 4 statement For every ǫ > 0, m, and k, there are m ′ > m and k ′ > k so that for every l and n there are l ′ > l and n ′ > so that |a m ′ ,l ′ − a n ′ ,k ′ | < ǫ which has one fewer connective to deal with and suffices for the intended application [42] . (Nonetheless, the proof goes through sentences of higher complexity.)
In [37] , the Simmons and the author applied this technique to a result in differential algebra [21] . The main result of [21] is Π N 2 , so the final bounds are of the form "for every n and d in N there is a b in N", but various intermediate steps have higher complexity.
In [17] , Goldbring, Hart, and the author apply a variant of these methods to sentences in continuous logic: in [7] , Boutonnet, Chifan, and Ioana show that certain Π 1 factors are not elmentarily equivalent by showing that their ultraprowers are non-isomorphic, but without constructing actual sentences. Goldbring and Hart [18] analyzed the complexity of the sentences distinguishing these Π 1 factors, but were not able to identify the precise sentences. The analysis in [17] proceeds by noting that the properties distinguishing the ultrapowers are expressible in L ω 1 ,ω (more precisely, some continuous variant of it), and then using the techniques in this paper to translate those into continuous sentences distinguishing the factors.
